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REPLY
RACIAL GERRYMANDERING IN A COMPLEX
WORLD: A REPLY TO JUDGE SENTELLE
Samuel Issacharoff

In his characteristic easy-going manner, Judge Sentelle leads off his discussion of the complex and contentious issue of race and redistricting by
proclaiming that Shaw v. Reno1 was completely "unremarkable and unsurprising." 2 Insofar as Shaw is read to hold only that claims of racial
gerrymandering are subject to federal constitutional scrutiny, Judge Sentelle is clearly correct. That proposition was established long ago in
Gomillion v. Lightfoot,3 in which the Supreme Court condemned the
"uncouth twenty-eight-sided" boundaries of Tuskegee, Alabama, as nothing more than an attempt to fence blacks out of a white preserve.'
To this unsurprising.development, Judge Sentelle adds another line of
unmistakably correct constitutional pedigree: exacting scrutiny attaches
whenever state authorities set about classifying citizens by race. Combining these two strains of thought leads in turn to the unremarkable proposition that the Constitution is presumptively offended when states use
racial criteria to engage in such first-order political decisions as assigning
electoral districts.
Given the tremendous constitutional force of these arguments, it takes
little more effort to seal the terms of debate by invoking the twentieth
century horrors attributable to unbridled state racialism. From Nazi Germany to South African apartheid-and, by implication to the Jim Crow
South as well-the defining feature of these odious forms of oppression
* Charles Tilford McCormick Professor of Law, The University of Texas School of
Law.
1. 509 U.S. 630 (1993).
2. David B. Sentelle, Racial Gerrymandering, Speech Before the Federalist Society
of the Columbus School of Law at the Catholic University of America (Nov. 1, 1995), in
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1249, 1249 (1996).

3. 364 U.S. 339 (1960).
4. Id. at 340.
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has been the license granted state authorities to distinguish, reward, punish, and even execute according to some racial mandate.
In replying to this direct and forceful argument, I clearly want to cede
to the moral force of arguments against racial license in official decisionmaking. Nonetheless, the world of politics that I see playing itself out in
the redistricting battles is more pluralistic, less ordered, and less governed
by clear-cut standards of neutral or proper rules of engagement than the
model Judge Sentelle proposes. In his view, the impetus toward racial
gerrymandering arises out of a departure from well-established norms for
allocating electoral opportunity. In my view, the world of jockeying for
electoral advantage is nastier and more complex. Its very complexity
blurs the high moral ground claimed by Judge Sentelle and threatens to
blemish all actors who intervene, most notably federal judges lacking a
clear constitutional mandate for the daunting task of judging politics.
At bottom, Judge Sentelle appears to find order in redistricting, marred
only by the imposition of questionable racial commands. By contrast, I
see in the redistricting battles a rather naked descent into pluralist politics
with race serving as one among many of the axes along which political
opportunity is allocated. As a result, I join this debate not so much to
defend race-based districting as to challenge the high-ground defenders
of a redistricting status quo ante claim. Redistricting, in my view, is as it
always has been: a nasty, brutish power grab. The fact that there are new
players and that they have an array of new computer tools at their disposal does not carry the day for me as it does for Judge Sentelle.

I.

PLURALIST BATTLES AND STATE-SPONSORED GOODS

Despite the apparent simplicity of the non-discrimination command
applied to the political arena, judicial intervention into the "political
thicket"5 of regulating elections has been ensnared on one inescapable
point. The problem arises from the need to give meaning to Chief Justice
Warren's declaration in Reynolds v. Sims 6 that the purpose behind constitutional oversight of the reapportionment and redistricting process was
the guarantee of "fair and effective representation." 7 However formulated in subsequent opinions, the guarantees of fairness and effectiveness
have repeatedly forced confrontations with the fact that how the political
process is set up goes a long way toward determining what the outcomes
5. Colegrove v. Green, 328 U.S. 549, 556 (1946) (affirming the district court's dismissal of a suit claiming unfair apportionment and finding such issues for the legislature to
address).
6. 377 U.S. 533 (1964).
7. Id. at 565.
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of elections shall be. The question emerges even from Judge Sentelle's
limited invocation of "traditional principles of redistricting, such as compactness, contiguity, and the preservation of the boundaries of political
subdivisions."8 I could take issue with the extent of the traditional commitment to these principles, as evident by the abandonment of compactness as a redistricting criterion in the Reapportionment Act of 1929. 9 But
I want to raise what I find to be a more troubling question: how is the
state to divide political goods available through the redistricting process?
Judge Sentelle aptly criticizes the racial component unleashed once
race is introduced as a variable in redistricting. But what are the alternatives? It is not as if there is a neutral redistricting process into which race
is injected as a stray and irrelevant criterion. Rather, redistricting conducted by political operatives is a contested process in which the actors
are exquisitely aware of the distributive consequences of each line imposed on the map. As political scientist Robert Dixon once aptly stated,
in essence, all redistricting is gerrymandering.' ° Even if no racial considerations were introduced, the "traditional practices" of redistricting
amount to an invitation to manipulate district lines to reward friends and
punish foes. What is key, and what reviewing courts have recognized uniformly," is that the consequences of redistricting practices are fully predictable and that political actors enter the redistricting battles with a clear
agenda of partisan gain.
The practical realities that coincide with redistricting raise a significant
problem when the knowable consequence of how lines are drawn is racial
exclusion. Where is the legitimacy conferred on the known, predictable
distribution of opportunity when no black districts are created? What
happens when, as the Harvard Law Review commented at the time of
Shaw, one stares at the portrait not of the cartographic fantasies currently
under attack, but of the all-white North Carolina congressional delegation of 1900-1990, the product of historic exclusion of blacks from politics
and the persistent patterns of racially polarized voting?' 2 Are we really
so confident that aberrant line-drawing on a map is a greater evil than the
continued predictable exclusion of representatives preferred by North

8. Sentelle, supra note 2, at 1252.
9. Reapportionment Act of 1929, ch. 8, § 2a, 46 Stat. 21, 26.
10. ROBERT G. DIXON, JR.,
LAW AND POLrrIcs 462 (1968).

DEMOCRATIC REPRESENTATION: REAPPORTIONMENT IN

11. See Davis v. Bandemer, 478 U.S. 109, 146-48 (1986) (O'Connor, J., concurring).
12. The Supreme Court, 1992 Term-Leading Cases, 107 HARV. L.REV. 27, 204
(1993).
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Carolina's still-embattled black population, a group commanding over
twenty percent of the state's population?13
I find these to be the persistent and disabling questions in the redistricting context. Let us take an alternative rendition of the North Carolina post-1990 redistricting fights. As a result of the post-1990 reapportionment, North Carolina was entitled to twelve congressional districts.14
Although the state was twenty percent black, and despite the fact that no
black representative had been elected to Congress from North Carolina
in this century, the state created only one district likely to send a black
representative to Congress.15 This districting configuration was the product of political accords within the Democratic Party which sought to preserve the power bases of incumbent congressmen from the heavily black
southeastern part of the state.16 Republican partisans in North Carolina
were frustrated in their attempt to use the creation of black power bases
to topple some Democratic incumbents. This led to a look to Washington, since all North Carolina redistricting had to be precleared by the
Attorney General under Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act.17 Following
an objection by the Department of Justice, then led by a Republican Attorney General, with abundant hints in North Carolina and elsewhere of
partisan considerations infusing the preclearance decisions of the Attorney General, the state faced a direct confrontation between incumbent
Democratic power and black electoral opportunity. Through astute compromise and even more clever cartographic manipulation, the state finessed this dilemma by creating the much-maligned 1-85 district. 8
Subsequently, this district survived constitutional challenge in front of a
three-judge district court comprised of a majority of Democratic appointees.1 9 In turn, a Supreme Court comprised of a majority of Republican
13. Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S. 630, 634 (1993).
14. Id. at 633.
15. Id. at 633-34.
16. Part of this history is recounted by Justice White in dissent. See id. at 673 n.10
(White, J., dissenting).
17. 42 U.S.C. § 1973(c) (1994). Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act provides that in
certain jurisdictions, such as North Carolina, before any change in voting qualifications or
voting practices or procedures may be implemented, it must be approved in a declaratory
judgment action before the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia or precleared
by the Attorney General. Id.
18. For descriptions of the political meanderings underlying Shaw, see Timothy G.
O'Rourke, Shaw v. Reno: The Shape of Things to Come, 26 RUTGERS L.J. 723 (1995);
Richard Briffault, Race and Representation After Miller v. Johnson, 1995 U. CHI. LEGAL F.
23, 35-37.
19. Shaw v. Barr, 808 F. Supp 461 (E.D.N.C. 1992), rev'd, Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S. 630
(1993).
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appointees forced reconsideration under strict scrutiny in Shaw 1.21 In
turn, a majority-Democratic appointed district court found that the challenged district survived strict scrutiny even under the exacting standards
articulated by Justice O'Connor in Shaw J.2' Not surprisingly, the
Supreme Court overturned the 1-85 district rather summarily in Shaw
H.22

It may properly be argued that the focus on partisan considerations
does not directly address the issue of the use vel non of racial determinants in redistricting. It is beyond dispute, however, that even where race
is a central consideration in redistricting, the point of departure in all line
drawing is a highly fractious partisan battle over turf. Geography may or
may not represent the natural divisions of political influence. 3 Moreover, even if race were removed from the equation, the choice among
potential geographic districts implicates the state in deciding among
proper interests to advance. In the district court opinion in Hays v. Louisiana,24 for example, the court found objectionable the aggregation of
different agricultural interests, specifically, soy bean versus sugar cane
farmers,2" within a district. While the reason why agricultural diversity
should trump diversity in racial representation was left unclear, the point
remains that district lines ultimately require governmental intrusion and a
"non-neutral" allocative decision.
To criticize the racial dimension of districting policies is not to establish
any independence from ulterior motives in districting, even were racial
considerations to be muted. In Gaffney v. Cummings, 6 the Supreme
Court recognized that the purpose of districting was to achieve an altered
and hopefully "more fair" distribution of representation than would obtain if elections were simply left at-large.27 But this objective unleashes a
broad array of governmental outcome-oriented intrusions into the constitutive phases of the political process. This outcome-oriented regulation is
present whenever districts are created to reward one group but not another. At some level, incumbent governmental powers decide what is to
be an agricultural district, a Republican district, an urban district, etc.
And with each outcome-oriented districting decision comes the inevitable
problem of the "filler people"-those individuals who are assigned to dis20. Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S. 630, 632 (1993).
21. Shaw v. Hunt, 861 F. Supp. 408 (E.D.N.C. 1994), rev'd, 116 S. Ct. 1894 (1996).
22. Shaw v. Hunt, 116 S. Ct. 1894 (1996).
23. See Briffault, supra note 18, at 43-44 (noting the influence of modern technology
as blurring geographic lines).
24. 862 F. Supp. 119 (W.D. La. 1994).
25. Id. at 127.
26. 412 U.S. 735 (1973).
27. Id. at 752.
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tricts to meet the one-person, one-vote requirements of apportionment,
but who have no realistic hope of ever having their preferred candidate
win. It is not, as Judge Sentelle slyly implies, that in the absence of racial
considerations, elections are left to the free and unfettered will of the
voters. Rather, the claims of whites assigned to black-majority districts
are along a continuum of frustrated parties locked into minority status in
territorially-based districts. Whether the lines of demarcation are urbanrural, Democratic-Republican, or black-white, the heavy hand of state
distribution is never far from the heart of the system of representation.
There is no escaping the fact that the consequences of imposing a raceneutral template on redistricting, without altering any other facet of how
representative elections are held, threatens to undo the most significant
vehicle to date for bringing heretofore excluded minorities into the halls
of elective politics. Race-conscious districting has been the centerpiece of
the desegregation of representative office in the United States overall,
and the South in particular.2 8 Concededly, it comes at a price, including
the very significant one of racial identities being locked in by the state.
This has been the heart of criticisms of race-conscious districting from
voices as diverse as Abigail Thernstrom,2 9 Justice Thomas,3" and Lani
Guinier.31 Whether the price is worth paying depends greatly on the alternatives. I have proposed elsewhere,32 and I will simply reiterate now,
that we have come too far to allow legislative bodies lacking meaningful
minority representation to claim political legitimacy. Despite the aspirations for the day that race can be put behind us, I agree with Professor
Pamela Karlan's bottom-line:
We have to face the fact that some form of racial politics and
thus some need for race-conscious representation devices is here
to stay, at least for the foreseeable future. The only real question is how to achieve fairness in the present while struggling for
justice in the future.3 3
28. See generally QUIET REVOLUTION IN THE SOUTH: THE IMPACT OF THE VOTING
ACT, 1965-1990 (Chandler Davidson & Bernard Grofman eds., 1994); Richard H.
Pildes, The Politics of Race, 108 HARV. L. REV. 1359 (1995) (reviewing the Davidson and
Grofman text).
29. ABIGAIL M. THERNSTROM, WHOSE VOTES COUNT? AFFIRMATIVE ACTION AND
RIGHTS

MINORITY VOTING RIGHTS

(1987).

30. Holder v. Hall, 114 S. Ct. 2581, 2591 (1994) (Thomas, J., concurring).

31.

LANI GUINIER, THE TYRANNY OF THE MAJORITY: FUNDAMENTAL FAIRNESS IN

REPRESENTATIVE DEMOCRACY

(1994); Richard Briffault, Lani Guinierand the Dilemmas

of American Democracy, 95 COLUM. L. REV. 418 (1995) (book review).
32. T. Alexander Aleinikoff & Samuel Issacharoff, Race and Redistricting: Drawing
Constitutional Lines After Shaw v. Reno, 92 MICH. L. REV. 588, 637-38 (1993).
33. Pamela S. Karlan, Our Separatism? Voting Rights as an American NationalitiesPolicy, 1995 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 83, 109.
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It may, of course, be argued that race is different, especially since racial
classifications trigger the core concerns of the Equal Protection Clause.
The difficulty comes with holding race out to be, for all intents and purposes, the only basis on which redistricting preferences may not be afforded. If, as I contend, the redistricting process is rife with self-dealing
and outcome-oriented manipulations, then where is the great moral divide that separates oddly drawn districts designed to afford historicallyexcluded minorities enhanced representation and districts drawn to reward the entrenched powers that be? This was the ultimate point
reached by Justice Stevens in his dissent in the Texas congressional redis34
tricting case, Bush v. Vera:
By minimizing the critical role that political motives played in
the creation of these districts, I fear that the Court may inadvertently encourage this more objectionable use of power in the
redistricting process. Legislatures and elected representatives
have a responsibility to behave in a way that incorporates the
"elements of legitimacy and neutrality that must always characterize the performance of the sovereign's duty to govern impartially." That responsibility is not discharged when legislatures
permit and even encourage incumbents to use their positions as
public servants to protect themselves and their parties rather
than the interests of their constituents.3 5

II.

THE PLIGHT OF THE JUDICIARY

Although my central focus is on the inevitable question of official distribution of political opportunity that of necessity accompanies redistricting, I want to raise an additional concern before concluding with some
speculations about where the ultimate resolution of the Shaw problem

might lie. My additional concern is with the institutional competence of
the judiciary to adjudicate claims under the current Shaw/Miller test for
unconstitutional racial aims in redistricting. I make two assumptions
about the current state of the law and the role of the judiciary. The first is
that Shaw and Miller have engendered a tremendous amount of confu-

sion both in the courts and among the various federal and state actors
who oversee the process of redistricting. While both Shaw and Miller
express evident disdain for some rather dramatic uses of racial considerations in the drawing of district lines, neither case prohibits the use of ra34. 116 S. Ct. 1941 (1996).
35. Id. at 1992 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (footnote and internal citations omitted); see
also Kristin L. Silverberg, Note, The Illegitimacy of the Incumbent Gerrymander, 74 TEX.
L. REV. 913 (1996) (challenging the use of incumbency to obtain rewards through
redistricting).
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cial considerations nor relieves states of the statutory obligation under
the Voting Rights Act to prevent the dilution of minority voting strength.
The strongest articulation of the Court's concern comes from Miller, but
provides little direct affirmative guidance to the states or to courts as how
to redistrict:
[T]he essence of the equal protection claim recognized in Shaw
is that the State has used race as a basis for separating voters
into districts. Just as the State may not, absent extraordinary
justification, segregate citizens on the basis of race in its public
parks, buses, golf courses, beaches, and schools, so did we recognize in Shaw that it may not separate its citizens into different
voting districts on the basis of race. The idea is a simple one:
"At the heart of the Constitution's guarantee of equal protection lies the simple command that the Government must treat
citizens 'as individuals, not "as simply components of a racial,
religious, sexual or national class.""' '3 6
The problem is that once districts are of equal population, there is no
clear individual component to districting decisions. If state redistricting
bodies are held to the command of insuring fairness greater than would
be the case in at-large elections, they cannot do so without looking to
systems of aggregation that necessarily reach beyond individuals. As Justice Powell expressed, "The concept of 'representation' necessarily applies to groups: groups of voters elect representatives, individual voters
do not."3 7
The second assumption is that the judiciary is an unlikely institution for
the delicate balancing of the political and distributional concerns that
underlie the redistricting process. There is ample authority for this
proposition, which ultimately rests on the argument that the judiciary,
empowered with "neither the purse nor the sword," 38 should avoid
squandering its limited moral capital on political battles.
I raised this concern directly with Judge Sentelle when we debated the
legacy of Shaw at the University of Texas School of Law last year. He
responded, unexpectedly from my vantagepoint, by invoking the judicial
involvement in school desegregation in cases such as Swann v. Charlotte-

36. Miller v. Johnson, 115 S. Ct. 2475, 2485-86 (1995) (quoting Metro Broadcasting,
Inc. v. FCC, 497 U.S. 547, 602 (1990) (O'Connor, J., dissenting), overruled by Adarand
Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 115 S. Ct. 2097 (1995)) (citations omitted) (emphasis added).
37. Davis v. Bandemer, 478 U.S. 109, 167 (1986) (Powell, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part).
38. Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 267 (1962) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
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Mecklenburg Board of Education39 and Green v. County School Board.4"
Judge Sentelle's point was that if the judiciary had to be the institution of
last recourse to break the resistance of racialism in one walk of institutional life (i.e., schools), why could it not serve the same role in breaking
the affliction of racial classifications in another, to wit, the political process? The invocation of school busing as the predicate for Shaw provoked a look of extreme discomfort on the face of my colleague,
Professor Lino Graglia.4 But the point is a serious one: if racialism has
infected the state processes of redistricting, what other institution but the
judiciary should undertake its dismantling?
The response must begin with precisely the experience of relatively unguided judicial interventions in an area such as busing. I would contend
that as a general matter the Court's experience with broad-scale remedial
interventions is most successful when there are some clear commands directing the terms of engagement. The Court's commands to date, either
in the form of Shaw's condemnation of departures from traditional districting principles or Miller's challenge to race as the "predominant" factor in redistricting, 42 fall far short of a bright-line rule, such as oneperson, one-vote.
We are now six years into the decennial redistricting cycle and the avenues of exit for the courts are nowhere readily apparent. Since Shaw I
and Miller, the Court has decided congressional redistricting cases from
North Carolina (again) and from Texas. Behind them are several more
cases now forming a queue for further Court review. This ongoing and
indecisive entry into the tangled world of redistricting exacts real institutional costs. The complex world of redistricting defies any expectation
that this is an area in which the Court can provide "a cue to a fellow
39. 402 U.S. 1 (1971). In this regard, Judge Sentelle may be drawing on the relatively
successful experience with court-directed school busing in his home state of North Carolina. See generally DAVISON M. DOUGLAS, READING, WRITING, & RACE: THE DESEGREGATION OF THE CHARLOTTE SCHOOLS (1995).

40. 391 U.S. 430 (1968).
41. Professor Graglia's opposition to school desegregation decrees is summarized in
LINO A. GRAGLIA, DISASTER BY DECREE: THE SUPREME COURT DECISIONS ON RACE
AND SCHOOLS (1976).

42. Miller recast Shaw as follows:
Our circumspect approach and narrow holding in Shaw did not erect an artificial
rule barring accepted equal protection analysis in other redistricting cases. Shape
is relevant not because bizarreness is a necessary element of the constitutional
wrong or a threshold requirement of proof, but because it may be persuasive
circumstantial evidence that race for its own sake, and not other districting principles, was the legislature's dominant and controlling rationale in drawing its district lines
Miller v. Johnson, 115 S.Ct. 2475, 2486 (1995).
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constitutional actor" through a broad articulation of constitutional principle. 43 Too many political actors will seize upon any ambiguity in the
Court's commands in order to revisit lost political battles in the judicial
forum. There is a genuine cost to judicial legitimacy when the federal
judiciary interferes with the core of the political process under a jurisprudence formed by what Judge Augustus Hand once termed a "judicial
hunch.",44 The absence of identifiable, guiding constitutional principles
threatens the integrity of judicial review over the political process and
threatens to expose the judiciary as simply one more political actor entwined in the political thicket.
III.

WHERE WILL THis LEAD?

Thus far, I have identified three main areas of disagreement with Judge
Sentelle. First, I see redistricting as a more complex, disorganized, and
ultimately factionalized process than he does. Second, I see much less
clarity and operational resolution in the Court's commands in Shaw and
Miller. Finally, I see a growing potential for compromising the role of the
judiciary through repeated and largely standardless interventions into the
constitutive steps of the political process.
My interpretation is no doubt a bleaker picture than that portrayed by
Judge Sentelle. I want to conclude, however, by proposing possible avenues of development for the Court's voting rights jurisprudence. Perhaps
in this fashion I can try to preserve some of the general tone of optimism
and faith in common sense that give Judge Sentelle's views such allure.
The first, and most apparent option, is for the courts to simply muddle
along. This is a real possibility given the ongoing division in the Supreme
Court and Justice O'Connor's critical role as the pivotal vote in the
Court's equal protection cases. At the core of Justice O'Connor's opinions are the competing concerns between racial factionalism that Judge
Sentelle identifies and an understanding that a categorical prohibition on
race-consciousness would forestall the remaining tasks of remediation directed toward disadvantaged minorities. Unfortunately, such an approach to the highly visible issue of redistricting has yielded fact-intensive
inquiries that leave state officials without clear guidance.
43.

PHILIP BOBBTT, CONSTITUTIONAL FATE: THEORY OF THE CONSTITUTION 194

(1982) (describing this function as "not the threat of invalidating legislation per se so much
as the argument for a different construction of the Constitution").
44. Letter from Augustus N. Hand to Louis D. Brandeis (Nov. 21, 1931), quoted in
Alexander M. Bickel & Harry H. Wellington, Legislative Purposeand the JudicialProcess:
The Lincoln Mills Case, 71 HARV. L. REV. 1, 16 (1957).

19961

Reply to Judge Sentelle

1267

Alternatively, a second approach might be to force redistricting out of
the immediate control of the political process. The danger in redistricting
is that insiders will seek to cement their sinecure through manipulation of
the electoral lines. Once the insiders legitimize the use of line-drawing to
achieve ulterior aims, there is little to bar other groups, including racial
and ethnic minorities, from claiming a reward as well. Interestingly, the
Supreme Court in the same Term as Miller upheld California's congressional redistricting in DeWitt v. Wilson." Although DeWitt offered clear
racial preferences in drawing majority-minority districts, the Court summarily upheld these districts. The major distinction between California's
redistricting plan and Georgia's, we may surmise, is that California used a
panel of Special Masters drawn from retired Supreme Court justices to
filter demands for group representation. The process could thereby appear less racially charged than what transpired in Georgia, even though
the Special Masters who oversaw redistricting were charged with giving
the Voting Rights Act "the highest possible consideration."4 6 The use of
institutional buffers, such as blue-ribbon commissions, may allow states
some compromise position between pure interest-group demands and the
risk that race-blind mechanisms will yield the continued exclusion of racial groups. Thus, it is possible that the Supreme Court was endorsing the
imposition of a filter on clear interest group demands that would allow a
reviewing court, such as the three-judge federal court in California, to
conclude, "The Masters did not draw district lines based deliberately and
solely on race, with arbitrary distortions of district boundaries. The Masters, in formulating the redistricting plan, properly looked at race, not as
the sole criteria in drawing lines but as one of many factors to be
considered.""
The third possibility is that redistricting pressures will force states to
move away from redistricting in favor of alternative voting systems. Last
year, for example, I was asked to testify before the Texas State Legislature on behalf of a bill that would allow school districts to use limited and
cumulative voting techniques for school board elections. The impetus for
this change came from small, rural school districts in West Texas. These
school districts were seeking some way to provide representation to the
growing Hispanic communities in that part of the state. At the same
time, the school districts desperately wanted to avoid litigation over district lines under either the Voting Rights Act or the Equal Protection
Clause. For them, alternative voting systems provided a means for ac45. 115 S. Ct. 2637 (1995), affg 856 F. Supp. 1409 (E.D. Cal. 1994).
46. Wilson v. Eu, 1 Cal. 4th 707, 714 (1992).
47. DeWitt v. Wilson, 856 F. Supp. 1409, 1413 (E.D. Cal. 1994).
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commodating minority concerns without the pressures of racial linedrawing that would arouse the scrutiny of Shaw and Miller.48
A similar pattern can be found in Judge Sentelle's home state of North
Carolina. In the aftermath of Shaw I, state Republicans proposed dividing the state's congressional delegation into three areas and electing rep49
resentatives by cumulative voting from within each of the three areas.
Clearly the import behind the proposal was to accommodate diverse representation while diminishing the inevitable political jockeying that accompanies line-drawing.
IV.

CONCLUSION

Whether any of these developments takes hold before the next round
of reapportionment and redistricting is, of course, unclear. Much remains
in the hands of the Supreme Court which has to date been quite chary
about providing direct guidance. Nonetheless, the experience of the
1990s round of redistricting has been too messy and costly for all involved
to remain stable. Whereas Judge Sentelle sees interest-group demands as
the point of vulnerability, I am more inclined to see the entire system of
political redistricting as at risk. Perhaps more critically, where Judge Sentelle sees demands for racial representation as a repudiation of traditional
patterns of redistricting, I see such demands as the logical and inevitable
heir to state assignment of representational opportunities. In my mind,
Judge Sentelle has not proven his bottom-line: whether racial demands
for representation constitute anything more than a more cartographically
imaginative version of what has always gone on in back-room
redistricting.

48. For a discussion of the use of cumulative voting in a rural setting, see Richard H.
Pildes & Kristen A. Donoghue, Cumulative Voting in the United States, 1995 U. CHI.
LEGAL F. 241.
49. Peter Applebome, Guinier's Ideas on Voting Rights Gaining GreaterAcceptance,
DALLAS MORNING NEWS, Apr. 10, 1994, at 7A.

